Wealth, weather risk, and the composition and profitability of agricultural investments by Rosenzweig, Mark R. & Binswanger, Hans P.
Policy  Research
WORKING PAPERS
[  Country  Operations
Technical  Department
Latin  America  and  the Caribbean
The  World Bank
December  1992
WPS  1055
Wealth,  Weather  Risk,
and the Composition
and Profitability
of Agricultural  Investments
Mark R. Rosenzweig
and
Hans  P. Binswanger
Investment  portfolios  of small  farmers  reflect  theirdifficulties  in
smoothing  consumption  in the face of high risks. Improving
farmers' ability to smooth consumption  - perhaps through
public  employment  schemes  or increased  consumption  credit-
would  increase  the overall  profitability  of their  investments  and
would  decrease  inequality  of earnings  in high-risk  areas.
PolicyReseachWodkingPaprs  dissernidin  gsofwo*kinn pr  ss  andenouragetheechangeofidas  amongBank  staffand
aloothe  batcrested in  devdBopmen  issu sBoepapers,  mntaibutedbythemRena  Adviso  Stafb  canythenaies.ofthauthorsreflect
only their viewfs,ndshould  beused and ditedsaccdingly.  laef  ndings, intapretatdon,  ad  condlusionsaslethe  authors' own. They should



















































































































This paperis a prGduct  of the  Latin America  and  the Caribbean  Technical  Department.  Copies  of the paper
are available free from the World  Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington,  DC 20433. Please  contact
Caroline  Banton,  room 14-049,  extension  34783  (December  1992,42 pages).
Despite  the growing  evidence  that farmers  in  incomes:  A one-standard-deviation  decrease  in
low-income  environments  are risk-averse,  there  weather  risk (measured  by the standard  deviation
ha. been little empirical  evidence  on the impor-  of the timing of the rainy season)  would  raise
tance of risk in shaping the actual  allocation  of  average  profits by up to 35 percent among
production  resources  among  farmers  differenti-  farmers  in the lowest wealth  quartile.
ated by wealth.
Moreover,  rainfall  variability  induces  a more
Rosenzweig  and Binswanger  use panel data  unequal  distribution  of average  incomes  for a
on investments  in rural India  to examine  how the  given  distribution  of wealth. Wealthier  farmers
composition  of productive  and nonproductive  are willing  to absorb  significant  risk without
asset holdings  varies across  farmers  with differ-  giving  up profits to reduce production  risk.
ent levels of total wealth and across  farmers  Smaller  farmers  have to invest  their  limited
facing  different  degrees  of weather  risk.  wealth  in ways that reduce  their exposure  to risk
at the cost of lower profit rates.
Income  variability  is a prominent  feature  of
the experience  of rural  agents  in low-income  The authors  found  that at high levels  of
countries. Rosenzweig  and Binswanger  report  rainfall  variability,  differences  in rates of profit
evidence,  based on measures  of rainfall  variabil-  per unit of agricultural  assets were similar  across,
ity, that the agricultural  investment  portfolio  classes of wealth.  But over the sample  range of
behavior  of farmers in such settings  reflects  risk  rainfall  variability,  these  rates of profit  were
aversion,  due evidently  to limitations  on con-  always  higher  for the poorer farmers  than for the
sumption-smoothing  mechanisms  such as crop  wealthier  ones,  suggesting  that the disadvantages
insurance  or credit markets.  The authors' results  of small  farmers  in risk  diffusion are more  than
suggest  that uninsured  weather  risk is a signifi-  offset by their labor  cost advantage.
cant cause  of lower  efficiency  and lower average
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Appendix  ...  *.  .........................  .........  . Page  40A major issue  in the  economic  development  literature  has  been the
relationship  between  average  productivity  and the  distribution  of wealth,  in
particular  the  distribution  of land. Attention  '.as  been focused  on how features
of rural  labor  markets  in low-income  settings,  such as  market  segmentation  and
nutrition-wage  interactions,  imply  that  efficiency  gains  could  arise  from  an
equalizing  distribution  of land (e.g.,  Mazumdar,  1977;  Dasgupta  and  Ray, 1984).
These  concerns  have led  to a large  number  of empirical  tests  of technical  scale
economies  (e.g.,  Bardhan,  1973),  of farm  household  "separability"  (Lopez,  1986;
Pitt and  Rosenzweig,  1982;  Benjamin,  1992),  and  of  health-wage  associations
(Behrman  and Deolalikar,  1987).
Studies  related  to the  distribution-efficiency  issue  in low-income  rural
areas  have tended  to ignore  risk  considerations,  although  the  advantages  of large
landowners  in obtaining  credit  has  been recognized  (Sen,  1966). Despite  the
growing  evidence  that farmers  in low-income  environments  are risk-averse
(Moscardi  and  deJanvry,  1977;  Dillon  and Scandizzo,  1978;  Binswanger,  1980,
Antle,  198?  and  1989),  however,  there  has been little  empirical  evidence  on the
importance  of risk  in shaping  the  actual  allocation  of production  resources  among
farmers  differentiated  by wealth. Empirical  work on contractual  relations  in
low-income  rural  areas  has also  not  been successful  in obtaining  credible  or
consistent  empirical  relationships  between  wealth  and risk  behavior  (Bell  and
Srinivasan,  1985),  in  part because  of population  heterogeneity  in risk  attitudes.
In this  paper  we utilize  panel  data from  rural  India  on investments,  wealth
and rainfall  to examine  how the  composition  of  productive  and  non-productive
asset  holdings  varies  across  farmers  with different  levels  of total  wealth  and
across  farmers  facing  different  degrees  of weather  risk.  In  particular,  we i)
measure  the riskiness  of farmers'  investment  portfolios  in terms  of their
sensitivity  to  weather  variation,  ii)  implement  a test  of the  central  feature  of
1an investment  equilibrium  characterized  by risk-averse  agents,  namely  the
existence  of a positive  association  between  the  average  returns  to individual
production  assets  and their  sensitivity  to  weather  variability,  and iii)  estimate
how the influence  of exogenous  weather  risk  on  portfolio  riskiness  and  on farm
profitability  varies  with total  wealth.
We focus  on  weather-related  risk for  two  reasons. First,  there  is a great
deal of information  on  weather,  so that  this important  and  exogenous  component  of
the riskiness  of the  environment  can  be measured  along  with the farmer  responses
to it. 1 Second,  although  weather  is  not the  only factor  exogenously  affecting
the  variability  in farm  output  and  profits,  it is the factor  contributing  to
income  variability  that  is  most likely  to influence  welfare.  This is  because
weather  risk is spatially  covariant. Unlike  for  idiosyncratic  risk,  it is
difficult  for farmers  to  undertake  arrangements  that  insure  against  risks  such  as
rainfall  that affect  everyone  in their  local  community  similarly. Risk  will  be
reflected  in ex ante investment  and  production  decisions  only to the extent  that
risk  is  not insurable,  and  weather  risk  appears  to be uninsured  in  most low-
income  settings.
Prior  studies  of farmer  risk  aversion  (Just  and  Pope, 1978;  Antle,  1987  and
1989)  assume  that farmers  cannot  insure  against  any  risk  ex ante and  cannot
perform  any consumption  smoothing  ex post.  In these  studies  farmer  utility
depends  on farm income,  so  that farmer  consumption  variability  is isomorphic  with
farm  profit  variability. Recent  evidence  (Rosenzweig,  1988;  Rosenzweig  and
Stark,  1989;  Walker  and  Jodha,  1986),  also  based  on the same data  used in this
paper,  suggests,  however,  that  rural  agents  employ  a variety  of formal  and
informal  mechanisms  that  contribute  to ex  post consumption-smoothing.  Moreover,
the  same data even  suggests  that  such  agents  are  successful  in insuring  against
all  non-covariant  risk,  in particular  all  risk  that is  not common  to agents
2residing  in  a  given  village  (Townsend,  1990).  This  evidence  suggests  that
measuring  risk  preferences  based  on  the  relationship  between  moments  of  the
distribution  function  of  total  farmer  profits  may  not  be  appropriate  because  not
all  of  profit  riskiness  affects  utility,  as  is  assumed  in  the  farm-based  studies.
Estimates  of  consumption  preferences  cannot  be  obtained  without  specifying  the
constraints  facing  agents,  in  particular,  the  mechanisms  they  have  established
for  ex  post  consumption-smoothing,  inclusive  of  stock  accumulation.  We  do  not  in
this  paper,  therefore,  attempt  to  directly  measure  risk  preferences. 2
In  part  one  of  the  paper,  we  set  out  a  framework  for  exploring  the
determination  of  the  portfolio  of  agricultural  investments  under  risk  which
explicitly  incorporates  the  first  two  moments  of  the  distribution  of  weather
outcomes  and  takes  account  of  farmers'  differing  ex  post  abilities  to  deal  with
weather  risk. The  model  is  based  on  the  assumption  that  farmers,  according  to
their  risk  preferences  and  ex  post  abilities  to  cope  with  risk,  choose  a  set  of
assets  differentially  sensitive  to  weather-variability.  The  model  provides  a
test  for  the  existence  of  risk  aversion  and  establishes  the  relationship  between
exogenous  risk  and  portfolio  choice  by  wealth  class.  Estimates  of  the  production
technology  are  shown  to  be  sufficient  in  this  framework  to  test  for  risk  aversion
and  to  measure  portfolio  riskiness  among  individual  farmers?3
Section  two  contains  a description  of  the  data  and  a  discussion  of
measurement  issues,  with  particular  attention  to  the  measurement  of  weather,  and
a test  of  the  relative  importance  of  weather  variability  and  other  sources  of
income  risk  in  actually  influencing  consumption.  In  section  three,  the  profit
function  estimates  are  presented  and  tests  of  scale  economies,  of  the
applicability  of  the  two-moment  distributional  assumption,  and  of  the
risk-aversion  investment  equilibrium  are  reported.  In  the  next  section,
estimates  of  the  influence  of  weather  risk  and  wealth  on  the  riskiness  and
3profitability  of farmers'  asset  portfolios  are  estimated. These  estimates  are
also  used to test for  the  existence  of heterogeneity  in risk-preferences.
The empirical  results  reject  the  hypothesis  that the  composition  of
agricultural  investments  r flects  technical  scale  economies. They support  the
hypothesis  that  the composition  of asset  portfolios  are  influenced  significantly
by farmers'  aversion  to  risk,  by their  wealth  and  by the  degree  of rainfall
variability. In particular,  farmers  in riskier  environments  select  portfolios  of
assets  that are less  sensitive  to rainfall  variation  and thus  less  profitable.
The results  also indicate  that  the trade-off  between  profit  variability  and
average  profit  returns  to wealth  is significant  and that  the loss  in efficiency
associated  with risk  mitigation  is considerably  higher  among  the  poorer  farmers.
As a consequence  of uninsured  weather  risk,  average  incomes  are  thus  not only
lower  but income  inequality  is  exacerbated  relative  to the  distribution  of
wealth. The results  also  indicate  that  average  profit  losses  for  wealthier
farmers  are smaller  than  for less-wealthy  farmers  in rainfall-variable
environments  and  differentials  in rates  of profit  per  unit of  productive  wealth
by wealth  class  shrink  as rainfall  variability  increases. Nevertheless,  in our
sample,  rates  of profits  for  small  farmers  always  exceeded  those  of the
wealthiest  farmers  over the  sample  range  of rainfall  variability.
1.  Theoretical  Framework
We consider  a farmer  with  total  asset  holdings  (wealth)  W who allocates  his
n production  assets  prior  to the  realization  of a random  weather  outcome  w in
order  to  maximize  his expected  utility  of consumption. Because  we will be
directly  estimating  the  effects  on the  investment  portfolio  of measured
characteristics  of the  distribution  of the  stochastic  weather  variable,  it is
particularly  convenient  to represent  the farmer's  expected  utility  rankings  for
consumption  in terms  of  his preference  ordering  over  moments  of the  distribution
4of  consumption.  This  is  so  because  it  is  straightforward  to  map  changes  in  the
moments  of  the  observed  stochastic  variable  (weather)  into  changes  in  the  moments
of  the  consumption  distribution.  Moreover,  Meyer  (1987)  has  demonstrated  the
consistency  of  the  two  sets  of  rankings,  for  the  first  two  moments  of  the
distribution  of  payoffs,  when  the  stochastic  payoff  variables  differ  from  each
other  only  by  location  and  scale  parameters.  Under  this  condition,  a  wide
variety  of  functional  forms  for  expected  utility  models  are  consistent  with
models  incorporating  mean-standard  deviation  rankings.  Since  we  utilize  direct
information  on  the  stochastic  variable  we  will  be  able  to  test  for  this
condition.
The  farmer  maximizes
(1)  U =  V( 0 ,o°)*  V,,  >  O,  V0 <  0,
where  1A and  a,  are  the  mean  and  standard  deviation  of  consumption.  Meyer  has
also  demonstrated  that  the  quasi-concavity  of (1)  is  sufficient  to  guarantee
convexity  of preferences,  so that  V,,,  V,,  <  0  and V.,V,,  - V2 a  0.
The  farmer  can  influence  the  arguments  in  (1)  by  choosing  an  appropriate
mix  of  production  investments.  Normalizing,  arbitrarily,  by  the  nth  production
asset  and  assuming  a  profit  function  linear  homogenous  (CRS)  in  the  investment
inputs,  we  can  express  the  relationship  between  the  mean  and  standard  deviation
of  farmer  profits,  p;  and  on,  the  productive  investment  portfolio  vector  d,
(where  the  element  ai  = value  share  of  the  ith  investment  input  in  total  wealth),
and  the  mean  and  standard  deviation  of  the  stochastic  weather  distribution,
and 
0@,  respectively,  as:
(2) M  Wf(&a)u 1 and
(3)  a  =  Wr(di)a.,  f=.  r 0 <  0. 2
Note  that  in  (2)  and  (3)  the  mean  and  standard  deviation  of  profits  per  unit  of
wealth  are  homogenous  of  degree  0  in  total  wealth  W, teflecting  the  CRS
5assumption.  They  are  homogeneous  of  degree  one  in  the  first  two  moments,
respectively,  of  the  weather  distribution.  The  homogeneity  assumption  for  the
weather  variable  is  similar  to  most  specifications  of  stochastic  output  in  the
theoretical  literature  on  agricultural  risk  utilizing  the  expected  utility
framework  (see  Feder  1977).  We  have  also  for  simplicity  assumed  that  there  is
one  source  of  stochastic  variability  in  profits.  It  is  straightforward  to
consider  multiple  weather  shocks,  and  we  test  for  these  below.  With  one  source
of  profit  variability,  r  measures  the  riskiness  of  the  asset  portfolio. 4
The  mean  of  consumption  is  given  by
(4) Me =  /n.
The  mapping  of  the  standard  deviation  in  profits  to  that  of  consumption  depends
on  what  is  assumed  about  capital  market  constraints.  If  assets  cannot  be  sold
and  borrowing  is  not  possible  then  a.  =  l,  as  is  assumed  in  farm  risk  studies
(e.g.,  Just  and  Pope,  1978  and  1979;  Antle,  1987  and  1989).  On  the  other  hand,
if  farmers  are  fully  insured  against  income  fluctuations,  oa  a  °,  as  is  assumed
in,  for  example,  studies  of  savings  based  on  the  permanent  income  hypothesis
(e.g.  Wolpin,  1980;  Paxson,  1992).  Most  likely,  the  situation  is  somewhere  in
between  these  extreme  cases. Moreover,  the  sensitivity  of  consumption
variability  to  ex  post  profit  variability  may  depend  on  the  total  level  of  asset
holdings,  for  which  there  may  be  a limited  market  and  which  may  serve  as
collateral  for  loans.  Rosenzweig  and  Stark  (1989),  for  example,  report  that  the
association  between  the  variances  of  intertemporal  profits  and  consumption  was
significantly  lower  for  Indian  farmers  with  greater  inherited  wealth,  and
Binswanger  and  Rosenzweig  (1986)  report  that  wealthier  Indian  farmers  were
substantially  heavier  borrowers.  Both  of  these  studies  utilized  the  same  survey
data  to  be  employed  in  this  study.  Accordingly,  we  express  the  relationship
between  consumption  and  profit  variability  as  influenced  by  total  wealth:
6(5)  a.  =  K (W)ao,
with K'(W)  <  0.
The  set  of  first  order  conditions  are  given  by
(6)  V  f  aV-r  a,  i a  ~ai
where  fa  fi  - f.  and  ra  =r  - r,,  with  fj  and  ri marginal  contributions  of
the  jth  production  capital  to  the  mean  and  to  the  standard  deviation,
respectively,  of  profits.  The  profit  maximization  condition  is  f  = 0.
Therefore,  expression  (6)  indicates  that  if  farmers  are  risk-averse  and  capital
assets  differ  in  their  contributions  to  profit  variability  (r  a  0),  then  as ai
long  as farmers'  incomes  are  not  perfectly  insured,  (0  <  K  S  1)  (mean)  profits
will  be lower  than  mean  profits  would  be  if  farmers  were  able  to  maximize
(expected)  profits.
A readily  testable  implication  of  an  investment  equilibrium  characterized  by
risk-aversion,  embodied  in  (6),  is  the  existence  of  a  positive  association  across
all  production  assets  between  marginal  contributions  to  the  mean  and  to  the
variability  of  profits,  as  for  any  two  assets  i  and  k,
(7)  ofi/fak  =ar/r 
A second  implication  of  imperfectly  insured  consumption  combined  with  risk-
averse  investment  behavior  that  follows  from  the  positive  relationship  between
r  and  f  is  that  a shift  to  assets  that  make  higher-than-average  contributions
a1 a1
to  profit  variability  in  equilibrium  ("risky"  assets)  induces  a rise  in  mean
profits,  since  risky  assets  must  have  higher  average  returns.  Farmers  more
willing  or  more  able  to  bear  risk  0:%s  should  not  only  hold  high-r  investment
portfolios  but  should  exhibit  higher  average  profits  per  unit  of  wealth.
Implications  can  also  be  derived  from  this  framework  concerning  the  wealth-
differentiated  effects  of  weather  risk  on  the  riskiness  of  farmer  portfolios  and
their  profitability.  These  are  derived  in  the  Appendix.  First,  it  can  be  shown
7that the  effect  of a mean-preserving  change  in the  standard  deviation  of the
weather  distribution  leads  to a reduction  in r,  portfolio  riskiness,  and
therefore  in farm  profitability. The  magnitude  of the  effect  of an increase  in
weather  riskiness,  however,  declines  with the total  wealth  of the farmer  if i)
there  is declining  relative  and  absolute  risk  aversion  or ii)  i'  < 0,  wealth
facilitates  ex post consumption  smoothing. Thus,  wealthy  or "large"  farmers  may
possibly  be  more efficient  than  small  farmers  (and  exhibit  more variable  incomes)
in areas  in which  weather  risk  is sufficiently  high,  even if risk  aversion  does
not depend  on wealth,  as long  as the  more  wealthy  are  better  able than  the less
wealthy  to smooth  consumption. Because  the  responsiveness  of asset  portfolios  to
risk  depends  on both  preferences  and  on constraints,  it is clear  that the
observed  relationship  between  the  moments  of the  profit  distribution
(profitability  and  riskiness  in  this  case)  by wealth  class  cannot  alone  be used
to characterize  preferences,  as in  Antle (1989). More importantly,  the  overall
profitability  of farmer  asset  portfolios  and  the inequality  in the distribution
of profits  can  be improved  via interventions  that do not  necessarily  require  a
redistribution  of wealth;  in  particular  those  that reduce  constraints  on ex post
consumption-smoothing;  e.g.,  credit  market  improvements,  weather  insurance,  or
employment  schemes  may be as effective. However,  as discussed  in Binswanger  and
Rosenzweig  (1976),  covariance  and  moral  hazard  make the  establishment  of credit
programs  and insurance  particularly  difficult  in rural  areas,  and the  poor
experience  of such schemes  is testimony  to this  difficulty  (Hazell  et a!., 1986).
2.  The Data
The  preceding  framework  indicates  that  to test for  the existence  of an
investment  equilibrium  conditioned  by risk  and to assess  the  interactions
between  total  wealth  holdings,  agricultural  risk  and the  composition  of
investment  portfolios  requires  time-series  data on investments,  wealth  and
8weather.  The ICRISAT  Indian  village  surveys  (Singh  et al., 1985)  provide
detailed  time-series  information  on agricultural  production  and investments for
farm  households  over a period  of up to  ten  years.  Begun  in the  crop  year 1975-76
in six  villages  in three  agroclimatic  regions  of the Indian  semi-arid  tropics,
the survey  collected  longitudinal  information  approximately  every  three  weeks  on
all transactions  (purchases,  sales,  production,  investment)  for  40  households  in
each  village,  30 of which  were cultivating  households. In addition,  on
approximately  July 1  of each  year a complete  asset  survey  was undertaken  for  all
survey  households. As part of the survey,  daily  rainfall  information  was also
obtained. At the conclusion  of the  survey,  there  were ten  years  of information
collected  for  three  of the  villages,  seven  years.  for  one, and  nine  years  of
information  for  two of the  original  six  villages. In 1980-81,  two other  villages
(each  with 40 households)  were added  to the  survev  and  were surveyed  for  four
years;  another  two  villages  (80  households)  were added  in 1981-82  and  were
surveyed  for  three  years.  It is thus  possible  with these  data to construct  a
number  of alternative  measures  of rainfall  incidence  and  variability,  and to
measure  asset  portfolios,  total  farmer  wealth  and farm  profits.
The semi-arid  tropics  in  which  the  ICRISAT  study  villages  reside  are
characterized  by low levels  of erratically-distributed  rainfall. As a
consequence,  agricultural  incomes  are  low  and quite  variable--in  the  six
original  villages  for  which  there  is from  seven  to ten  years  of information,  the
average  coefficient  of variation  in  total  farm  profits (net  of the  value  of
family  labor)  was 127.5 In contrast,  our  analysis  of the earnings  of U.S.
white  males  aged 25-29  in 1971,  surveyed  in seven  rounds  of the  National
Longitudinal  Survey  of Youth,  indicated  that  the  average  coefficient  of
variation  in earnings  was only 39.  Total  wealth  holdings  in the  six  villages  are
very unequally  distributed. Based  on sample-period  averages  of real  wealth  for
9each farm  household,  the  top  20 percent  of farmers  own over 54 percent  of all
wealth. Mean total  wealth  holdings  (in  1983  rupees)  was 54,158  rupees,  with a
median  of 33,265  rupees. The  minimum  average  value  of wealth  holdings  was 4,154;
the  highest  was 453,581  rupees. Mean farm  profits,  also in 1983  rupees,  was
5,825.
3.  Specification  of the  Technology  and the  Measurement  of Weather
To estimate  the  profitability  and riskiness  of asset  portfolios,  we
aggregated  the  detailed  information  on (annual)  asset  holdings  into  nine
categories,  by value,  using  1983  prices: unirrigated  landholdings;  irrigated
landholdings,  inclusive  of the  value  of irrigation  equipment;  draft  animals,
including  bullocks  and  water  buffalos;  milk animals;  other  animals,  including
chickens  and goats;  traditional  farm  implements,  including  manual  plows,  carts,
blades,  hoes;  modern  machinery,  including  tractors;  liquid  capital,  including
financial  assets  and food  stocks,  and consumption  assets,  including  consumer
durables  and  housing.
To estimate  the relationship  between  the  two  moments  of the  weather
distribution  and  profits,  imposing  as little  structure  as possible  on the
technology,  we characterize  the  profit  function  using  the  normalized  quadratic
form,  where  we normalize  by total  wealth  holdings  W.  Thus  profits for  each
farmer  k in period  t are  given  by
(8) nkt - E  pPikt  +  MA E  6 ji,aiktajkt  +  E  yiaikt±  t +  yUwt  +  skt  +  Vk,
where  ekt  is an i.i.d.  error  and  vk  is a time-invariant  error. The parameters  in
(8)  are assumed  to pertain  to all farmers  and  solely  reflect  technology. The
latter  will be so as long  as pre-harvest  variable  inputs  are  allocated  in fixed
proportion  to assets  and farmers  maximize  short-run  profits,  given the  set  of
als,  based on the  weather  outcome  realized  after  all investments  have  been
undertaken.6
10One advantage  of the  quadratic  form (8)  is that  statistical  tests  of global
quasi-concavity  (in  the ai)  can  be readily  implemented  (Lau,  1976),  because  the
relevant  Hessian  matrix  of second  partials  consists  only  of the  estimated  6is.
If (8)  is quasi-concave  in the  ai,  it is then  possible  to solve  for  the  expected
profit-maximizing  investment  portfolio  for  each  weather  environment  and thus  to
measure  farmer-specific  deviations  in investment  portfolios  from  their
expected-profit  optimum.  Moreover,  the  riskiness  r  of each farmer's  portfolio  of
investments  based  on (3)  and (8)  is  of a simple  form:
(9)  r = sqrt((Eyiai  +  y')2)
i
The  appropriate  procedure  to obtain  estimates  of the pi,  6i,  and  y.  depends
on  what is assumed  about  the  error  terms.  If the  time-invariant  error  vk  is
correlated  with the investments,  then  a farmer  fixed  effects  estimator  (Mundlak,
1978)  provides  consistent  parameter  estimates. As the  portfolio  of ails  is
measured  at the  beginning  of the  crop  season,  we assume  that  neither  ot,  the
realization  of weather  in period  t,  nor  ekt,  the  unobserved  shock  to production,
is  known  to the farmer  prior  to the  implementation  of  his asset  plan for  period
t.  The  orthogonality  between  actual  weather  in period  t and the  ex ante
investment  portfolio,  net of the  permanent  distributional  characteristics  of
weather,  is testable  and  we test  it  below.
The remaining  issue  in obtaining  estimates  of the  technology  parameters  is
the characterization  of  weather. We take  an empirical  approach. We used the
daily  rainfall  information  to construct  six  measures  of rainfall: the  beginning
and end  dates  of the rainy  season  (monsoon),  where the  monsoon  onset  is
determined  as the  date after  which  there  has  been at least  20 mm of rain  within
several  consecutive  days after  June 1;  the fraction  of days  within  the  season
with rain;  the average  rain  per  day  during  the season,  and the length  of up to
11two intraseasonal  drought  periods. Village  "folklore"  suggests  that  the  timing
of the  monsoon is the  most important  aspect  of weather (and  uncertainty). We
therefore  first  regressed  total (real)  profits  from  crop  production  and total
farm  profits (crop  profits  plus  profits  from  animal  products)  on the  monsoon
onset  date and then  on all  six  weather  variables,  using all farm  households  in
the  ten ICRISAT  villages.
Reduced-form  random  effects  estimates  of the influence  of the rainfall
variables  on profits  are  presented  in Table  1.7  The initiation  date of the
monsoon  does significantly  affect  both crop  and  total  profits--a  one standard-
deviation  delay (16  days)  in the  start  of the  monsoon  reduces  crop (total)
profits  by 222 (150)  rupees,  or  by approximately  6 (3)  percent  (average  sample
profits  from crop  production,  in 1983  rupees,  is 3700). We could  not reject  the
hypothesis  that the five  other  measures  of rainfall,  included  in the
specification  reported  in the  second  column  for  each  profit  variable,  do  not add
to the  explanatory  power  of the  profit  regressions. Moreover,  inclusion  of the
other  rainfall  variables  does  not  appreciably  alter  the effect  of the  onset
variable. Of the  other  rainfall  measures,  the only  potentially  important
candidate  is the fraction  of days  with rain.  Accordingly,  we use both  this
measure  of rainfall  and the  onset  date  as weather  variables  in our estimation  of
(8),  and  undertake  additional  tests  of their  importance. That the  quantity  of
rainfall  is far less  important  than its  timing  is consistent  with the  well-known
difficulties  experienced  by researchers  using  rainfall  quantities  to explain
yield (Herdt,  1972)  or the  allocative  behavior  of farmers  (McGuirk  and  Boissert,
1988)  based  on aggregate  Indian  data. 8
The  village-level  rainfall  variables  explain  a small  proportion  of the
variability  in individual  profits. This  might  suggest  that  an investigation  of
the influence  of the riskiness  of these  variables  on farmer  behavior  would  not
12Table  1
Random  Effects  Estimates: Effects  of Rainfall  Measures  on Profits
(1983  Rupees)  from  Crop Production  and  Total Farm Profits
in Ten ICRISAT  Villages
Crop Profits  Total Profits
Weather  Variable  (1)  (2)  (1)  (2)
Monsoon  onset  date  -13.9  -15.7  -9.35  -12.4
(2.68)a  (2.78)  (1.68)  (2.05)
End of monsoon  - -1.29  - -. 357
(0.37)  (0.10)
Fraction  of days in season  - 1993  1722
with rain  (2.25)  (1.81)
Rain per day in season  - -85.1  - -108
(1.44)  (1.70)
Consecutive  days of intraseasonal  - -2.67  - -4.95
drought  - first  episode  :0.35)  (0.61)
Consecutive  days of intraseasonal  - -2.59  - -8.41
drought  - second  episode  (0.33)  (0.99)
Constant  7054  7619  7440  8219
(7.13)  (5.72)  (6.89)  (5.70)
F  82.0  25.2  87.7  26.9
x  (Breusch-Pagan)  7886  7809  8438  8394
n  2168  2168  2168  2168
a.  Absolute  values  of asymptotic  t-ratios  in parentheses.
13yield  significant  results--unmeasured  variability  in  profits,  due  to  sources
orthogonal  to  rainfall,  might  be  a far  more  important  source  of  risk. However,
even  if  all  of  the  residual  variability  in  profits  were  not  merely  measurement
error,  it  is  not  necessarily  true  that  such  variability  significantly  alters
behavior.  To  the  extent  that  non-weather-induced  income  variability  is  not
covariant  across  farmers  within  the  village,  such  risk  might  be  considerably
mitigated  ex  post  by  utilizing  locally-supplied  credit  or  via  other  village-based
risk-sharing  arrangements.  Binswanger  and  Rosenzweig  (1987)  and  Rosenzweig
(1988)  have  shown  that  most  loans  in  the  ICRISAT  villages  are  acquired  from  local
infonmal  sources  without  access  to  external  funds.  Moreover,  loans  appear  to  be
less  available  when  the  local  economy  is  subject  to  a  common  shock,  such  as  a
late  monsoon  (Rosenzweig,  1988).  Thus  weather-induced  profit  variability  may  be
far  less  insurable  than  idiosyncratic  or  household-specific  profit  variability,
necessitating  ex  ante  risk  reduction  through  altering  the  portfolio  of
investments  which  differ  in  their  sensitivity  to  weather  outcomes.  Investments
would  then  be  predominantly  responsive  to  weather  risk.
To  assess  the  relative  importance  of  weather-induced  and  other  sources  of
income  variability  on  consumption,  we  utilized  the  information  on  household  food
consumption  (85  percent  of  total  consumption)  that  is  available  for  nine  years  in
three  of  the  ICRISAT  villages.  In  column  (1)  of  Table  2  we  report  a  fixed
effects  regression  of  food  consumption  on  total  farm  profits  and  the  age  of  the
household  head. The  results  indicate  that  household  (food)  consumption  is  not
wholly  independent  of  current  farm  profits--a  100  rupee  decrease  in  profits
reduces  food  consumption  by  seven  rupees.  In  the  second  column  of  Table  2  we
regress,  again  using  fixed  effects,  food  consumption  on  fanm  profits  measured  net
of  the  effects  of  the  weather  variables.  This  profit  measure  is  the  residual
obtained  from  the  regression  of  farm  profits  on  the  weather  variables.  These
14Tabi  2
Fixed  Effects  Estimates:  Effects  of Total  Farm  Profits,  Inclusive  and
Exclusive  of the  Effects  of  Weather,  on Food Consumption
in  Three ICRISAT  Villages,  1975-1984
Variable  (1)  (2)
Age of household  head  -85.5  -71.9
(1.5 3)a  (1.35)
Age squared  .438  .373
(0.78)  (0.70)
Farm  profits  .0694
(5.76)
Farm profits  net  of effects  of  .00047
weather  (0.02)
F  13.6  2.86
n  720  720
a.  Absolute  values  of asymptotic  t-ratios  in  parentheses.
b.  Residual  from  household-specific  fixed-effects  regression  of total  farm
profits  on onset  of monsoon  in the  village.
.15~profit-weather  regressions  were run  separately  for  each  household,  since  the  risk
framework  suggests  that  weather  should  differentially  affect  profits  according  to
the individual  farmer's  composition  of assets  a  This residual  measure  of
household-specific  income,  orthogonal  to income  determined  by the  weather,  has  an
effect  on food  consumption  that is only  0.6  of a percent  that  of actual  profits.
Common  weather  shocks  to income  appear  to  have substantially  greater  consequences
for  consumption  than  does idiosyncratic  risk,  a result  consistent  with Townsend's
findings  (1990),  based  on the  same  data,  that  only  village-level  shocks  affected
the individual  movements  in consumption. 9 These  results  also suggest  that
estimates  of risk  preferences  based  on the  assumption  that farmers  have to absorb
all income  risk  are  misleading.
4.  Estimates  of the  Technology  and  Tests  of the  Risk  -Aversion  Investment
Equilibrium
Table  3 reports  test  statistics  based  on our  estimates  of the  normalized
restricted  profit  function  (8). In addition  to the  eight  investment  types
(excluding  consumer  durables  as part of the  normalization)  and the  two  weather
measures,  we included  in the  specification  total  wealth  and its  square,  to test
for  scale  effects,  the  number  of adult  male and female  family  members,  and the
schooling  and age  of the  household  head.  The test  statistics  indicate  the timing
of the  monsoon  has a statistically  significant  effect  on total  farm
profitability,  while  the set  of 13 coefficients  associated  with the  proportion  of
days  with rain is  not statistically  significant  at even  the ten  percent level.
In subsequent  tests,  therefore,  we only consider  the influence  of the  monsoon
onset  variable.
Does the  principle  measured  risk  variabl.e,  the  monsoon  onset  date,  conform
to the location  and scale  transform  assumption  of the  mean-standard  deviation
analysis  of risk?  As noted,  if the  onset  date  is  normally  distributed,  this
16Table  3
Test  Statistics: Normalized  Quadratic  Profit  Functiona
Hypothesis  Test Statistics
No effect  of  monsoon  onset  date  F(13,1742)  - 6.73
No effect  of fraction  of days  with rain  F(13,1742)  - 2.01
No scale  effect  F(2,1742) - 2.09
No effect  of adult  male family  members  F(14,1742)  - 6.99
No effect  of adult  female  family  members  F(14,1742)  - 3.39
No effect  of schooling  of head of household  F(14,1742)  - 1.49
No effects  of age of  head of  household  F(14,1742)  - 2.79
a.  Estimation  procedure: fixed  effects.
17property  holds. Figure  1  presents  a  normal  quantile  plot  of  this  rainfall
measure,  based  on  75  observations.  The  plot  suggests  some  conformity  to  the
normal,  with  perhaps  fatter  tails.  The  Kolmogorov-Smirnov  test  statistic  is
.119,  which  is  only  statistically  significant  at  the  20  percent  level  of
significance.  We thus  cannot  reject  the  assumption  that  the  monsoon  onset  date
has  a  normal  distribution. 10
Of  the  other  test  statistics,  the  results  indicate  the  absence  of
technological  scale  effects  on  profits.  Differences  in  investment  portfolios
across  wealth  classes  evidently  do  not  arise  from  technical  scale  economies.  The
results  also  indicate  that  schooling  has  no  effects  on  profits,  but  reject  the
hypothesis  that  the  age  of  the  farmer  does  not  affect  profits  (the  marginal
return  is  positive  at  sample  mean  values).  These  latter  results  are  consistent
with  the  hypothesis  that  in  environments  subject  to  risk  but  characterized  by
stationarity  in  weather  and  very  slow  technological  change,  experience,  but  not
formal  schooling,  has  real  payoffs,  as  found  in  Rosenzweig  and  Wolpin  (1985)."
The  tests  also  reject  the  hypothesis  that  the  size  of  the  family  labor  force  does
not  influence  profits.  This  result  appears  to  contradict  the  findings  by  Pitt
and  Rosenzweig  (1986)  and  by  Benjamin  (1992),  based  on  Indonesian  data,
indicating  the  perfect  substitutability  of  hired  and  family  labor.
A  necessary  and  sufficient  condition  for  the  global  quasi-concavity  of  the
profit  function  (8)  in  the  a  is  that  the  Hessian  matrix  of  second  partials  with
respect  to the  ai,  consisting  solely  of the  O6jb.  be negative  semi-definite.
This  in  turn  implies  that  all  of  the  eigenvalues  of  the  Hessian  be  non-positive.
Based  on  our  set  of  point  estimates  of  the  61j,  six  of  the  eight  eigenvalues  were
negative.  To  test  if  the  non-negative  eigenvalues  indicate  rejection  of
quasi-concavity,  we  implemented  the  test  proposed  by  Lau  (1978).  We  reestimated
(8)  replacing  the  matrix  of  6ijs  by  parameters  corresponding  to  the  Cholesky
18Figure  1.
Rainfall  Start  Date Distribution





19factorization  of  that  matrix. Non-linear  least  squares  estimates  of (8),  with
Cholesky  factor  terms  replacing  the  6ij,  yield  direct  estimates  of  the  Cholesky
factors,  which  also  should  be  non-positive.  These  results  indicated  that  we
cannot  reject  quasi-concavity  at  any  reasonable  level  of  statistical
significance,  due  to  the  two  non-negative  Cholesky  factors  being  measured  with
very  little  precision. However,  our  point  estimates  of  the  6ij  make  it
impossible  to  find  a  set  of  ai  that  maximize  expected  profits.
Based  on  the  normalized  profit  function  parameter  estimates,  we  present  in
Table  4 for  all  eight  investment  inputs  the  computed  marginal  profit  level
effects,  evaluated  at  the  sample  means,  and  the  marginal  profit  variance  effects,
with  their  associated  asymptotic  t-ratios.  Sample  mean  investment  sh'ares  are
reported  in  the  leftmost  column,  with  their  standard  deviations.  All  estimated
effects,  reported  in  columns  two  and  three,  are  relative  to  the  effects  of
consumer  durables  and  housing.  The  results  reject  the  hypothesis  that  the
investment  inputs  have  identical  profit  variance  or  profit  level  effects.  The
Spearman  rank  correlation  across  the  eight  types  of  capital  stocks  between  level
and  variance  effects  is  positive,  in  conformity  to  expression  (6),  but  not
statistically  significant  at  the  15  percent  level. The  principle  deviants  from
the  risk-aversion  investment  equilibrium  condition  are  the  liquid  assets  and
draft  animal  categories--there  appears  to  be  severe  underinvestment  in  both
assets  despite  their  not  contributing,  on  the  margin,  to  increasing  profit
variability.  Exclusion  of  draft  animals  leads  to  a rank  correlation  between
level  and  variability  effects  of .68,  which  is  statistically  significant  at  the
.01  level.  Exclusion  of  both  draft  animals  and  liquid  assets  yields  a  rank
correlation  of  .83,  which  is  also  statistically  significant  at  the  .01  level.
What  may  account  for  the  underinvestment  in  both  liquid  assets  and  draft
animals?  The  framework  set  out  in  section  1  does  not  accommodate  the  possibility
20Table  4
Estimated  Normalized  Profit  Level  and Profit  Variance  Effects  of
Changes  in the  Shares  of Productive  Capital  Items
Relative  to Consumer  Durable  and  Housing  Wealtha
Share  of Total  Marginal  Profit  Level  Marginal  Profit  2Var-
Capital  Item  Wealth (ai)  Effect  (aff/aai)  iance  Effect (ar  /la,)
Irrigated  land.  0.132  0.0656  0.0645
(0.226)b  ( 2.4 5 )c  (0.80)c
Dry land  0.591  0.0289  -.0496
(0.317)  (1.62)  (0.78)
Traditional  imple-  0.0073  1.285  1.184
ments  (0.013)  (3.87)  (1.20)
Modern implements  0.00376  0.127  3.891
(0.0403)  (0.63)  (8.86)
Draft animals  0.0223  1.167  -0.644
(0.0312)  (10.6)  (1.34)
Milk animals  0.0249  0.00234  -0.152
(0.0433)  (0.02)  (0.47)
Other livestock  0.0174  0.156  0.568
(0.0381)  (1.35)  (2.39)
Liquid  assets  0.0806  0.0928  -2.45
(0.0826)  (2.22)  (1.40)
Consumer  durables  0.121
and  housing
Spearman  rank correlation,  .262
level  and variance  effects
Spearman  rank correlation,  .679
excluding  draft animals
Spearman  rank correlation,  .829
excluding  draft animals  and liquid  assets
a.  Computed from  normalized  restricted  profit  function  estimates  at sample
means of a,.
b.  Standard  deviation  in parentheses  in  column.
c.  Absolute  values  of asymptotic  t-ratios  in  parentheses  in column.that  specific  capital  items  may  be  more  or  less  useful  in  smoothing  consumption
ex  post. With  the  k-function  having  as  arguments  not  only  total  wealth  but  a'.
as  well,  the  equilibrium  condition  (6)  becomes
(6') Vfa  = -vaa  [  raix  +  ica'r.
If  (6')  is  the  correct  characterization  of  the  equilibrium,  then  without  prior
knowledge  of  the  association  between  the  profit  variability  and  ex  post
consumption  smoothing  effects  xa
ci  for  each  al,  it  is  no longer  possible  to  know
how  profit  level  and  profit  variability  effects  will  be  correlated.
It  is  not  surprising  that  liquid  assets  (financial  assets  and  food  stocks)
play  a  role  in  smoothing  consumption  as  well  as  provide  a  source  of  funds  for
purchasing  variable  inputs.  However,  evidence  in  Rosenzweig  and  Wolpin
(forthcoming)  based  on  the  ICRISAT  data  suggests  that  bullocks  play  a  predominant
role  in  consumption  smoothing  among  the  other  durable  agricultural  stocks.  Given
evident  constraints  on  borrowing  and  the  liquidity  of  bullocks,  most  farmers  are
unable  to  sustain  profit-maximizing  bullock  stocks,  which  thus  exhibit  high
marginal  profit  level  returns.
5.  Weather  Risk,  Wealth  and  the  Riskiness  and  Profitability  of  Farm
Investment  Portfolios
Based  on  the  estimates  of  the  profit  function  and  on  the  actual  asset
portfolios  a  L of  the  household  we  can  construct  individual  measures  of
portfolio  riskiness  rk,  from  (9),  for  each  farm  household  k. There  is
considerable  inter-household  variability  in  r--based  on  survey-period  averages
for  each  household,  the  sample  mean  of  r  is  .000632  and  the  standard  deviation  is
.000539.  At  the  sample  mean  of  wealth,  the  mean  estimate  of r  implies  an  average
standard  deviation  in  total  household  profits  of  544  rupees  at  the  mean  standard
deviation  of  the  monsoon  onset;  the  average  coefficient  of  variation  in  profits
22associated  with the  average  r  measure  of portfolio  riskiness  or weather
sensitivity  is thus  9.3.
The risk framework  suggests  that  portfolio  riskiness  should  vary  with the
first  two  moments  of the  weather  distribution  and  with total  wealth. Moreover,
the effect  of an increase  in weather  risk (a  mean-preserving  shift  in the
variability  of  weather)  on the riskiness  and  profitability  of the  portfolio  is
likely  to depend  on the  total level  of  household  wealth. A problem  with testing
for  wealth  effects  is that,  at any  given  point  in time,  both accumulated  wealth
as well as the investment  portfolio  will reflect  the farm  household's  subjective
risk preferences,  which  may vary across  the  farmers  in our sample. 12 The
observed  cross-household  association  between  wealth  and  the risk  characteristics
of the asset  portfolio,  given  heterogeneity  in  risk  preferences,  does  not conform
to the result  that  would  be obtained  by randomly  assigning  wealth  levels  across
farmers.
The ICRISAT  data enable  us to  use two  procedures  that  may circumvent  the
bias due  to risk-preference  heterogeneity. First,  to the  extent  that  preferences
are time-invariant,  a fixed  effects  procedure  will provide  consistent  estimates
of wealth  effects  on portfolio  allocations.  However,  because  the  moments  of the
weather distribution  are also time-invariant  (under  stationarity),  use of the
fixed  effects  procedure  does not allow  the  identification  of the  direct  effects
of the  characteristics  of the  weather  distribution  on portfolio  choice. An
alternative  procedure  is to  use inherited  wealth,  also available  in the data,
instead  of current  wealth.  To the  extent  that the  wealth  inherited  by a farmer
is orthogonal  to his preferences  for  risk,  use of inherited  rather  than current
wealth reduces  biases  associated  with  heterogeneity.
Based  on the  data from the  six  original  villages  where the longer
time-series  of weather  are  available,  we report  in Table  5 estimates  of i) the
23Table  5
Determinants  of  Gamma  (x10 5):  Six  ICRISAT  Villages
Variable/  Random  Fixed  Random
Estimation  Procedure  Effects  Effects  Effects
Coefficient  of variation  -. 884  -.551
in  onset  (CV)  4  (4.1 4)a  (2.85)
CV  total  wealth  (xlO )  .133  .0693
(7.68)  (6.30)
CV  inherited  wealth  - .0731
(xlO )  ,4  (5.32)
Total  wealth  (xlO )  -7.10  -4.13
4  (5.72)  (4.93)
Inherited  wealth  (xlO )  -5.13
(4.78)
Mean  onset  date  .471  .132
(0.26)  (0.08)
Age  .590  .351  .490
(1.72)  (1.64)  (1.57)
Constant  76.3  69.1
(2.13)  (2.13)
F2  42.9  8.80  43.8
x2 (Breusch-Pagan,  d.f.-1)  328.8  176.5
x  (Hausman,  d.f.-3)  103.0  0.74
a. Absolute  values  of  asymptotic  t-ratios  in  parentheses.
.e4effects  on  portfolio  riskiness  r  of  changes  in  the  village-specific  mean  and
coefficient  of  variation  (expressed  as  a  percentage)  of  the  monsoon  onset  date
(CV),  ii)  household  total'wealth  and  iii)  the  onset  CV  interacted  with  wealth.
In  the  first  column,  the  coefficients  obtained  using  the  random  effects
estimation  procedure  are  reported. 13 The  results  conform  to  the  risk-aversion
model  in  which  farmers  are  characterized  by  decreasing  relative  risk  aversion
and/or  in  which  wealth  contributes  to  ex  post  consumption  smeothing.  At  the
sample  median  of  wealth,  an  increase  in  weather  risk  (the  onset  CV)  significantly
decreases  portfolio  riskiness.  And  the  effect  of  weather  risk  on  portfolio
riskiness  declines  significantly  with  wealth.
The  Hausman  test  indicates  rejection  of  the  hypothesis  that  the  right-
hand-side  variables  in  the  specification  reported  in  the  first  column  of  Table  5
are  uncorrelated  with  the  residual.  In  the  second  column  therefore  we  report  the
fixed  effects  estimates  of  the  determinants  of  r.  This  procedure  only  permits
the  identificatior.  of  the  direct  wealth  and  the  CV-wealth  interaction  effects.
These  are  highly  statistically  significant  and  conform  in  sign  pattern  to  their
random  effects  counterparts,  indicating  decreases  in  the  effects  of  the  weather
CV  on  r  as  wealth  levels  rise;  the  magnitudes  are  approximately  half  those
estimated  using  random  effects.  In  the  last  column,  we  replace  contemporaneous
wealth  with  inherited  wealth  (in  1983  rupees).  These  results  are  similar  in
magnitude  to  those  obtained  with  current  wealth  levels,  and  also  indicate  that
farmers  shift  to  less  risky  investment  portfolios  in  response  to  increases  in
weather  variabillity.  The  Hausman  test  lndicates  that  for  this  specification,  we
cannot  reject  the  hypothesis  that  the  inherited  wealth  variables  are  orthogonal
to  the  error  term.
The  results  in  Table  5 thus  lndicate  that  farmers  not  only  reduce  the
responsiveness  of  the  returns  of  their  asset  portfolio  to  rainfall  variatlon  when
25there  is  greater  expected  rainfall  variability  but  that  this  response  is
attenuated  as  wealth  increases.  To  assess  how  changes  in  weather  variability
affect  profit  variability  via  the  portfolio  response,  and  how  this  relationship
changes  with  wealth  level,  we  used  the  inherited-wealth  coefficients  in  Table  5
to  predict  r  for  the  range  of  values  of  the  standard  deviation  in  the  monsoon
onset  date  in  the  six  ICRISAT  villages,  from  9.4  to  25.1  weeks,  and  for  quintiles
of  the  wealth  distribution.  These  predicted  rts  were  then  used  to  compute  profit
variability  induced  by  rainfall,  measured  by the  CV  of  profits  (expressed  as  a
percentage).  The  CV  of  profits  at  each  wealth  level  is  based  on  the  relationship
(3)  between  the  standard  deviations  in  profits  and  weather.  Dividing  both  sides
of (3)  by  profits  yields:
(10)  CVI  =  Rr(a,,
where  R  is  the  inverse  of  the  profit  rate  expressed  in  terms  of  total  wealth
(11/W).  We  fixed  the  profit  rate  at  the  sample  mean  of  0.11.
Figure  2  displays  the  predicted  relationships  between  the  onset  standard
deviation  and  the  profit  CV for  four  farmer  wealth  classes.  As  can  be  seen,  for
farmers  at  wealth  levels  below  the  top  20  percent,  increases  in  rainfall
variability  increase  the  variability  of  profits  less  than  proportionally,  with
the  least  wealthy  farmers  attenuating  the  effects  of  weather  risk  to  the  greatest
extent  as  weather  risk  increases.  The  top  20  percent  of  farm  households,
however,  are  evidently  able  or  willing  to  completely  absorb  all  rainfall-induced
profit  risk,  as  reflected  in  the  linearity  of  the  profit-rainfall  variability
plot  for  this  wealth  group. As  a  consequence  of  the  differential  response  of
portfolio  riskiness  by  wealth,  differences  in  profit  variabilit,  by  wealth  class
widen  as  rainfall  variability  increases.  While  the  rainfall-induced  CV  in
profits  is  approximately  the  same  for  all  wealth  classes  at  the  sample  average  of
the  onset  standard  deviation  (13.6),  at  a rainfall  standard  deviation  of 19,  for
26Figure  2.
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- 20th  Percent.  - 40th  Percent.  - 60th  Percent.  - 80th  Percent.example,  the  rainfall  component  of  the  profit  CV  for  the  top  20  percent  of
farmers  is  50  percent  greater  than  that  of  the  bottom  20  percent  (10.7  versus  7).
The  central  proposition  of  the  portfolio  model,  as  expressed  in  equilibrium
condition  (6),  is  that  farmers  trade-off  income  variability  with  profitability.
The  results  in  Table  S  and  Figure  2,  therefore,  suggest  that  profit  levels  should
not  only  be less  affected  by  weather  risk  among  wealthier  farmers  but,  at  least
in  environments  with  high  rainfall  variability,  the  profitability  of  wealthier
farmers  per  unit  of  wealth  may  exceed  that  of  the  less  wealthy,  given  the  evident
higher  ability  or  willingness  of  the  wealthy  to  tolerate  profit  variability.  To
examine  relationships  between  farm  profits,  weather  variability,  and  wealth  we
use  the  same  procedures  and  specifications  as  employed  in  obtaining  estimates  of
the  determinants  of  portfolio  riskiness,  except  that  the  current-year  onset  date
is  also  included.  because  the  current  weather  state  affects  profit  realizations
but  not  the  pre-season  composition  of  assets). 14 The  equilibrium  condition  (6)
implies  that  the  coefficient  sign  patterns  for  profits  should  be  the  same  as
those  for  r.
Table  6  reports  the  estimates  of  the  reduced-form  determinants  of farm
profit  levels.  In  the  specifications  based  on  contemporaneous  wealth  levels,  the
coefficient  estimates  are  similar  in  sign  patterns  to  those  of  Table  5,  as
expected.  The  estimates  also  appear  to  be  robust  to  estimation  procedure.  In
particular,  the  statistically  significant  wealth  and  CV-wealth  interaction
coefficients  are  almost  identical  when  estimated  using  random  or  fixed  effects,
and  the  Hausman  test  indicates  only  marginal  rejection  (.06  level)  of  the
hypothesis  that  heterogeneity  may  be  biasing  the  set  of  profit-level
coefficients,  in  contrast  to  the  strong  rejection  for  the  r  estimates.  The
specification  employing  inherited  rather  than  current  wealth,  reported  in  the
last  column  of  Table  6,  is  estimated  less  precisely,  but  the  CV/inherited  wealth
28Table  6
Determinants  of  Profit  Levels:  Six  ICRISAT  Villages
Variable/  Random  Fixed  Random
Estimation  Procedure  Effects  Effects  Effects
Coefficient  of  variation  -24.7  -11.2
in  onset  (CV)  (1. 33)a  (1.06)
CV-total  wealth  (xlO )  2.91  3.28
(2.35)  (2.03)
CV  inherited  wealth  - 2.11
(xlO  )  (2.89)
Total  wealth  (xlO )  440.8  308.2  -
.4  (51)(2.84)
Inherited  wealth  (xlO  (  (28)25.1
(0.44)
Onset  date  -14.2  -13.2  -15.9
(2.11)  (1.93)  (1.17)
Mean  onset  date  247.8  -229.1
(1.46)  (2.46)
Age  24.4  40.1  394.6
(0.95)  (1.13)  (3.88)
Constant  194.0  - 1990
(0.06)  (0.54)
F2 66.6  29.2  34.0
X 2 (Breusch-Pagan,  d.f.-1)  1924  2769
x  (Hausman,  d.f.-3)  15.2  0.53
a. Absolute  values  of  asymptotic  t-ratios  in  parentheses.
.29interaction  term  also indicates  that in response  to increases  in weather
variability  less-wealthy  farmers  are  significantly  more willing  to sacrifice
profit  levels  than are  wealthier  farmers.
The statistically-acceptable  first-column  parameter  estimates  suggest  that
at wealth  levels  up to 84,830  rupees,  corresponding  to the top 19  percent  of the
sample  farmers  ranked  by wealth,  higher  variability  in the  monsoon  onset  date is
associated  with significantly  lower  average  profits.  The  wealth  distribution
cutoff  point,  where  weather  variability  no longer  depresses  mean profits,  is
remarkably  similar  to the  wealth  cutoff  at which  weather  variability  no longer
decreases  portfolio  riskiness. The  costs  of decreased  riskiness  are  not small
and are  borne  significantly  more heavily  by the less  wealthy. At the  mean wealth
level,  a one standard  deviation  increase  in the onset  date  coefficient  of
variation  (29.5)  lowers  average  profits  by 264 rupees,  or by 4.5  percent. At the
wealth  median,  profits  are lower  by 443 rupees  for  every  one standard  deviation
increase  in the  onset  date  CV, a reduction  in  mean profits  of 15 percent,  while
for  farmers  with  wealth  holdings  below  the  25th percentile,  average  profits  are
lowered  by 555 rupees. This cost of risk  reduction  represents  35 percent  of
average  profits  for the  lowest  quartile  of farmers.
Does the reduced  sensitivity  of wealthy-farmer  profit  levels  to rainfall
risk implied  by our  estimates  suggest  that wealthier  farmers  in rainfall-risky
areas  have higher  profits  per  unit of  wealth  than smaller  farmers? For each  of
the four  wealth  groups  depicted  in Figure  2 figure  3  plots  the predicted  rates  of
profit  per  unit of productive  wealth (wealth  less  the value  of consumer  durables)
for  different  values  of the  standard  deviation  in the rainfall  onset  date,  based
on the first  column  profit-level  estimates  in Table  6.  These  results  show that
profit  rates  fall considerably  faster  for  the less  wealthy  farmers  as rainfall
variability  increases,  and that  for  the  top group  they  do not fall  at all.  The
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sharp,  resulting  in  a  tendency  to  convergence  in  profit  rates  as  rainfall
variability  increases.  At  the  sample  mean  standard  deviation,  the  difference
between  the  profit  rate  of  the  bottom  (second)  quintile  farmers  and  that  of  the
top  quintile  is  20 (5)  percentage  points;  this  differential  shrinks  to  15  (2)
percentage  points  when  the  standard  deviation  is  19. However,  at  all  of  the
sample  values  of  the  onset  standard  deviation  smaller  farmers  exhibit  higher
rates  of  profit  than  larger  farmers.
6.  Conclusion
Income  variability  is  a  prominent  feature  of  the  experience  of rural  agents
in  low-income  countries.  In  this  paper,  we  have  obtained  evidence,  based  on
measures  of  rainfall  variability,  that  the  agricultural  investment  portfolio
behavior  of  farmers  in  such  settings  reflects  risk  aversion,  due  evidently  to
limitations  on  ex  post  consumption-smoothing  mechanisms.  Our  results  suggest
that  uninsured  weather  risk  is  a significant  cause  of  lower  efficiency  and  lower
average  incomes--a  one  standard  deviation  decrease  in  weather  risk  (measured  by
the  standard  deviation  of  the  timing  of  the  rainy  season)  would  raise  average
profits  by  up  to  35  percent  among  farmers  in  the  lowest  wealth  quartile.
Moreover,  rainfall  variability  induces  a  more  unequal  distribution  of  average
incomes  for  a  given  distribution  of  wealth. This  latter  feature,  resulting  from
the  evident  willingness  of  wealthier  farmers  to  absorb  significantly  more  risk
while  reaping  higher  average  returns  than  less-wealthy  farmers,  is  evidence
against  the  common  supposition  that  smaller  farms  are  always  more  efficient  than
larger  farms,  a  presumption  that  tends  to  ignore  the  returns  to  agricultural
investment  holdings.  In  our  data,  we  found  that  at  high  levels  of  rainfall
variability  differences  in  rates  of  profit  per  unit  of  agricultural  assets  were
similar  across  wealth  classes.  However,  over  the  sample  range  of  rainfall
32variability  these  rates  of  profits  were  always  higher  for  the  poorer  farmers  than
for  the  wealthier  ones.
The  results  suggest  that  improvements  in  the  abilities  of  farmers  to  smooth
consumption,  perhaps  via  increased  consumption  credit,  would  increase  the  overall
profitability  of  agricultural  investments;  similarly,  the  availability  of  rain
insurance  would  both  raise  overall  profit  levels  in  high-risk-areas  and  decrease
earnings  inequality  within  those  areas.  Given  the  apparent  private  and  social
gains  from  weather  insurance,  specifically  for  monsoon  timing  insurance,  why  do
we  not  observe  a  market  for  it? While  the  supply  of  insurance  against  the
vagaries  of  rainfall  should  be  less  afflicted  by  moral  hazard  among  farmers  than
yield  insurance,  our  results  indicate  that  the  demand  for  rainfall  insurance  may
be  quite  weak. First,  a substantial  proportion  of  profit  risk  is  idiosyncratic,
and  evidently  well-diffused.  Second,  demand  for  weather  insurance  would  come
primarily,  if  not  exclusively,  from  poor  farmers.  Wealthy  farmers  are  evidently
unwilling  to  pay  a premium,  via  reduced  averaged  profits,  to  reduce  their
exposure  to  ex  ante  weather  risks.
Our  study  has  only  been  concerned  with  behavior  responsive  to  the  first
two  moments  of  the  weather  distribution.  Although  this  appears  to  be  supported
by the  data,  longer  time-series  on  rainfall  (and  other  aspects  of  weather)  may
permit  richer  models  of  risk  behavior,  as  would  data  with  a  larger  number  of
agro-climatic  environments.  Our  analysis  has  also  taken  the  distribution  of
total  wealth  holdings  as  given,  although  our  empirical  analysis  accommodated
heterogeneity  in  risk  preferences  and  its  consequences  for  the  accumulation  of
wealth  levels.  Finally,  our  model  was  concerned  solely  with  the  role  of  assets
in  mitigating  risk  ex  ante  and  assumed  away  dynamic  behavior,  in  particular  the
holding  of  assets  to  smooth  consumption  ex  post. Indeed,  we  obtained  some
evidence  that  in  the  environment  studied,  conventionally-defined  liquid  assets
33and  draft  animals  appeared  to  be  traded  Intertemporally  in  response  to  realized
income  fluctuations.  A dynamic  analysis  of  investment  and  consumption  smoothing
incorporating  weather  risk  where  consumption-smoothing  opportunities  are  limited
may  shed  additional  light  on  the  determination  of  agricultural  investments
(Rosenzweig  and  Wolpin,  forthcoming).  Such  an  approach  may  also  be  a  more
appropriate  framework  with  which  to  study  savings  behavior  and  to  characterize
risk  attitudes  in  low-income  rural  settings,  where  Investment  and  consumption
decisions  are  closely  linked.
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We are grateful  to an anonymous  referee  and  an Associate  Editor for  helpful
comments  on an earlier  draft  of this  paper.  Useful  comments  were also  received
from  participants  at workshops  at the Universities  of Chicago,  Minnesota,  and
Virginia;  Brown,  Northwestern  and  Harvard  Universities  and the  Technion
University,  Israel.
1.  Rainfall  information  has been  used to study  intertemporal  consumption
behavior  in the  context  of  models in  which  there  are  no constraints  on
farmers'  abilities  to smooth  consumption  (Wolpin,  1982;  Paxson, 1992).
2.  Rosenzweig  and  Wolpin (forthcoming)  estimate  a fully-specified  dynamic
structural  model  of stock  accumulation  incorporating  credit-market  constraints
and informal  insurance  based  on the data  set  used here.  These  permit
identification  of farmer  preference  orderings,  and  indicate  that farmers  are
risk averse. Tractability  constraints  limited  the  model to one asset
(bullocks)  and  one  wealth  class,  however.
3.  Antle (1989),  in an innovative  and  careful  study  based  on a subset  of the
same data  used here and  that  became  known  to  us after  we had completed  our
study,  also employs  the  insight  that  if farmers  optimally  manage their  asset
portfolios  information  can  be learned  from  technology  estimates  about  risk
behavior.  Based  on the additional  assumption  that  farmers  cannot  smooth
consumption,  however,  Antle  attempts  to estimate  the distribution  of risk
preferences  without  estimating  the rest  of the  demand  structure. We do  not
believe  that this latter  assumption  is supported  by the  data and that
therefore  reliable  inferences  can.be  made about  the derivatives  of farmer
preference  functions  based  on this  method,  at least  from the  data used  here.
Moreover,  no attempt  in that study  is  made to relate  risk  preferences,  even  if
they  were identified,  to the  wealth  position  of farmers  nor to quantify  the
costs of the constraints  on consumption  smoothing  or their  distribution.
4.  For (2)  and (3)  to be interpreted  as reflecting  a profit function,
variable  inputs  must be allocated  so as to  maximize  profits  or in fixed
proportion  to the farm  assets. The former  assumption  is clearly  plausible  for
inputs  allocated  after  the resolution  of  uncertainty. Antle's (1987)  results
suggest  that some  pre-harvest  inputs  reflect  farmer's  risk attitudes  (and  lack
of ex post protection)  but this  would  also  be true if such inputs  are
allocated  in fixed  proportions  with assets  and  the  asset  portfolio  reflects
risk factors. Rosenzweig  and  Wolpin (forthcoming)  test  the fit of a  model
which assumes  pre-harvest  input  proportionality  with one important  farm  asset,
bullocks.
5.  Profits  are computed  by subtracting  from  agricultural  receipts  all  paid
out costs  and  the total  cost  of family  labor  used in agricultural  production,
where days of family  labor  are  valued  at the  relevant  age  and sex-specific
market  wage rates.
6. See  note 3.
7.  The theoretical  framework  (equation  (2))  suggests  that the effects  of
rainfall  on profits  will differ  across  farmers  to the  extent  that they  choose
different  asset  portfolios. The estimated  gross  or reduced-form  effects  of
rainfall  on profits  reflect  the average  effects  in the  population. The
theoretically-more  appropriate  specification  from  which to infer  rainfall
effects  is equation  (8),  which is estimated  below. The results  indicating  the
38importance  of  the  monsoon  timing  are  not  sensitive,  however,  to  specification.
8. We also  regressed,  using  random  effects,  the  total  value  of  crop  output  on
the  rainfall  variables.  These  estimates  also  indicated  the  importance  of
rainfall  timing  relative  to  quantity.  Moreover,  the  monsoon  onset  date
explained  significantly  more  of  the  variability  in  output  than  in  profits,
with  a one  standard  deviation  in  the  onset  date  reducing  real  output  value  by
8.4  percent.  The  stronger  effect  of  the  timing  of  the  monsoon  on  output
compared  to  profits  reflects  the  ex  post  adjustment  of  variable  input  costs  by
farmers  after  the  resolution  of  the  timing  of  the  rainy  season.  The  scope  for
ex  post,  profit-maximizing  input  adjustment  thus  reduces  profit  risk  relative
to  output  or  yield  risk.
9. The  residual  also  contains  measurement  error  so  that  it  is  not  possible  to
quantify  the  effect  of  the  true  variability  in  profits  net  of  weather  shocks.
10. Antle  (1987  and  1989)  finds  that  the  distribution  of  profits  is  not
normal. However,  as  noted,  it  is  not  the  characteristics  of  the  1istribution
of  total  profits  that  matter  for  allocative  decisions,  only  that  for  the  part
of  profits  that  is  reflected  in  consumption  variability,  which  in  this  case  is
that  determined  by  rainfall.
11. The  lack  of  significance  of  schooling  is  not  due  to  the  fact  that
schooling  does  not  change  over  time. The  time-invariant  schooling  variable  is
interacted  with  all  time-varying  variables  (assets  and  rainfall),  which  vary
significantly  over  time  and  have  significant  effects  on  profits.  Of  course,
the  profit-function  schooling  result  does  not  mean  that  schooling  has  no
return  in  the  context  of  the  semi-arid  tropics  of  India.  Walker  et  al.  (1990)
show  that  schooling  augments  wage  earnings  (inclusive  of  non-agricultural
earnings).
12. By  heterogeneity  in  preferences  we  mean  inter-farmer  variation  in
preference  mappings.  The  evidence  on  "risk-preference"  heterogeneity  in
Binswanger's  experiments  (1980)  and  Antle's  econometric  studies  (1987  and
1989)  does  not  distinguish  between  variability  in  preference  mappings  and
variations  in  preferences  that  may  be  due  to  differences  in  constraints.  If
all  or  most  of  the  variation  in  the  measures  of  subjective  risk  aversion  are
due  to  constraint  variation,  then  we  need  be  less  concerned  about  the
endogeneity  of  total  wealth  holdings.
13. The  estimation  procedure  takes  into  account  the  non-independence  of  the
observations.  The  number  of  farmers  in  the  sample  used  to  obtain  the
estimates  in  Tables  5  and  6 is  135. The  total  number  of  observations  is  1407.
The  standard  Lagrange  multiplier  test  (Breusch-Pagan)  indicates  rejection  of
the  hypothesis  of  the  independence  of  the  errors.  The  statistic  is  reported
at  the  bottom  of  the  tables  (the  critical  chi-square  value  at  the  .005  level
of  significance,  for  one  degree  of  freedom,  is  7.88).
14. Inclusion  of  the  current  onset  data  in  the  reduced-form  r  equations,
based  on  the  investment  portfolios,  did  not  add  significantly  to  the
explanatory  power  of  those  equations,  as  expected.
39Appendix
To  establish  the  conditions  under  which  the  efficiency  and  portfolio
riskiness  of  farmers  changes  with  total  wealth  holdings  and  to  assess  how  the
sensitivity  of  profits  to  changes  in  weather  risk  is  altered  as  wealth  levels
increase,  we  first  note,  from  Meyer  (1987):
1. Farmers  exhibit  decreasing,  constant,  or  increasing  relative  risk
average  as R = (V.ii  +  VOOoO)VOF  - (V0* +  V 0 op)VI/V2  =  aV 1 +  bV  V2 ."O.
2. Farmers  exhibit  decreasing,  constant,  or  increasing  absolute  risk
aversion  as  A  V 0 V - V V/V2  =  0.
For  simplicity,  assume  that  there  are  only  two  types  of  capital  I  and  j
and  that  in  equilibrium  fa and  ra >  0,  i.e.  investment  good  i  is  the  risky
asset,  and  thus  high-ai  portfolios  are  both  riskier  and  more  profitable.  The
effect  of  a  mean-preserving  change  in  the  standard  deviation  of  the  weather
distribution  on  the  choice  of  the  risky  asset  is  given  by:
'a' .tf=  -IC Vof  + vV ra  Fx)wr  +  ]r-'
do,s  aI  V@a  a6~a 1
* c(swr  + vr  a  ]-I
where,  suppressing  subscripts,  0  =  Vpf=  + V,1faW  + VOr,a,oX  + V,or2icW
+  2VapfaWa1  <  0  by  second  order  conditions.
The  first  term  in  brackets  in (8),  swr, is  the  effect  on  the  riskiness  of
investment  due  to  a  wealth-independent  increase  in  the  variability  of
consumption,  and  is  negative;  the  second  bracketed  term  is  negative  as  long  as
a,  is  the  risky  asset. Thus,  ceteris  paribus.  when  farmers  are  not  fully
insured  (x  >  0)  an  increase  in  weather  risk  reduces  the  riskiness  of  their
portfolios  of  production  capital  and  mean  profitability.
The  effect  of  a  change  in  the  level  of  wealth  on  a.  is:
(9)  dWi  t  R  +  dain
dW
40Because  of  the  homogeneity  assumptions  embodied  in  (2)  and  (3),  an  increase  in
wealth  increases  by  the  same  proportion  both  the  mean  and  standard  deviation
of  profits  and  consumption.  It  is  thus  relative  risk  aversion  (R)  that
matters  in  determining  the  relationship  between  the  profitability  or  riskiness
of the  capital  portfolio  and  total  wealth,  as  shown  in (9). The  second  term
in  brackets  reflects  the  extent  to  which  wealth  directly  reduces  the
variability  in  consumption  for  given  variability  in  farm  profits  via  the  asset
or  credit  market.  Thus,  if  Kc  a  O,  farmers  cannot  save  or  barter,  decreasing
relative  aversion  is  necessary  and  sufficient  for  wealthier  farmers  to  be
holding  more  risky  portfolios  of  production  capital  and  to  be  more  efficient.
However,  with  wealth  accumulation  being  advantageous  in  the  credit  market
and/or  with  asset  resale  possibilities,  so  that  ce <  0,  decreasing  relative
risk  aversion  is  not  a  necessary  condition  for  consumption  riskiness  and
profitability  per  tunit  of  wealth  to  rise  with  total  wealth.  The  relationship
between  wealth  and  portfolio  behavior  thus  cannot  be  used  to  make  inferences
about  preferences.
The  relationship  between  total  wealth  and  the  impact  of  weather  riskiness
on  the  riskiness  (and  profitability)  of  the  stock  of  capital  inputs,  assuming
third  derivatives  of (1)  are  smalll,  is  given  by
(10)  d(dcta/da)/dW  ix[ri a  +  rsit-
di
Go  f 1 Afa  A+ ra xacS  +  aro,x  +  bf*4r 1
+  IC/ [daiL  - c
K  du.a  cVra  0e41]e i
In  expression  (10),  both  absolute  (A)  and  relative  risk  aversion  matter.
The  first  bracketed  term  is  positive  if  a  is  non-negative,  which  is  true  when
farmers  are  characterized  by  non-increasing  constant  relative  risk  aversion;
similarly,  the  second  bracketed  term  must  be  positive  if  farmers  are
characterized  by  non-increasing  absolute  and  relative  risk  aversion  (A,a,b  >
410) and f and r  are  concave. The last  bracketed  term in (10)  arises  from  the
potential  effect  of wealth  in facilitating  consumption  smoothing  ex post (KI  '
0) and  contributes  unambiguously  to wealth  diminishing  the  effect  of weather
variability  on portfolio  riskiness  and  profitability. Thus,  non-increasing
absolute  and relative  risk  aversion  are sufficient,  but not necessary,  for  the
investments  of  wealthier  farmers  to be less  influenced  by weather risk.
1.  Antle (1987  and  1989)  reports  evidence  that  the  third  derivative  of the
utility function  is  not small.  However,  as noted,  this evidence  is based  on
the assumption  that  no farmers  can shed  any income  risk.
42Pollcy  Research Working Paper Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS1033  Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean  My  T. Vu  November  1992  0. Nadora
Region  (and  Northern  America)  Eduard  Bos  31091
Population  Projections,  1992-93  Ann  Levin
Edition
WPS1034  Revising  Financial  Sector  Policy  David  H. Scott  November  1992  K.  Waelti
in Transitional  Socialist  Economies:  37664
Will  Universal  Banks  Prove  Viable?
WPS1035  How  Import  Protection  Affects  the  Wendy  E.  Takacs  November  1992  D. Ballantyne
Philippines'  Motor  Vehicle  Industry  37947
WPS1036  Output  Decline  in  Hungary  Simon  Commander  November  1992  0. del  Cid
and  Poland  in 1990-91:  Structural  Fabrizio  Coricelli  35195
Change  and  Aggregate  Shocks
WPS1037  Vocational  Secondary  Schooling,  Ana-Maria  Arriagada  November  1992  C.  Cristobal
Occupational  Choice,  and  Earnings  Adrian  Ziderman  33640
in  Brazil
WPS1  038 Determinants  of  Expatriate  Workers' Ibrahim  A.  Elbadawi  November  1992  A.  Marafion
Remittances  in North  Africa  and  Robert  de  Rezende  Rocha  31450
Europe
WPS1039  Education,  Extemalities,  Fertility,  Martin  Weale  November  1992  PHREE
and  Economic  Growth  33680
WPS1040  Lessons  of  Trade  Liberalization  in  Jaime  de  Melo  November  1992  D. Ballantyne
Latin  America  for Economies  in  Sumana  Dhar  37947
Transition
WPS1041  Family  Planning  Success  Stories  in  Moni  Nag  November  1992  0. Nadora
Bangladesh  and  India  31091
WPS1042  Family  Planning  Success  in  Two  Jane  T. Bertrand  November  1992  0. Nadora
Cities  in  Zaire  Judith  E.  Brown  31091
WPS1043  Deriving  Developing  Country  Stijn  Claessens  November  1992  R.  Vo
Repayment  Capacity  from  the  Market  George  Pennacchi  33722
Prices  of  Sovereign  Debt
WPS1044  Hospital  Cost  Functions  for  Adam  Wagstaff  November  1992  0. Nadora
Developing  Countries  Howard  Barnum  31091
WPS1045  Social  Gains  from  Female  Education:  Kalanidhi  Subbarao  November  1992  M.  Abundo
A Cross-National  Study  Laura  Raney  36820
WPS1046  World  Bank  Project-Financed  J. Price  Gittinger  November  1992  0. Nadora
Research  on  Population,  Health,  Carol  Bradford  31091
and  NutritionPollcy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for  paper
WPS1047 Cote d'lvoire: Private Sector  Enrique  Rueda-Sabater  November  1992  P. Infante
Dynamics  and Constralnts  Andrew  Stone  37642
WPS1048  Targets  and Indicators  in World  George  Baldwin  November  1992  0. Nadora
Bank Population  Projects  31091
WPS1049  Money  Demand  and  Seignorage-  William  Easterly  November  1992  R. Martin
Maximizing  Inflation  Paolo  Mauro  31448
Klaus  Schmidt-Hebbel
WPS1050 Marginal  Income  Tax Rates  and  William  Easterly  November  1992  R. Martin
Economic  Growth  in Developing  Sergio  Rebelo  31448
Countries
WPS1051  The  Legal  Framework  for Private  Cheryl  W. Gray  November  1992  M. Berg
Sector  Activity  In the Czech  and  36969
Slovak  Federal  Republic
WPS1  052 A Reappraisal  of How  Oral  Hoda  Rashad  November  1992  0. Nadora
Rehydration  Therapy  Affected  Mortality  31091
in Egypt
WPS1053 Development  of the Zimbabwe  Alex  F. Zinanga  December  1992  0. Nadora
Family  Planning  Program  31091
WPS1054  Distributional  Impact  of Cash  and  Branko  Milanovic  December  1992  S. Moussa
In-Kind  Social  Transfers  In Eastem  39019
Europe  and Russia
WPS1055  Wealth,  Weather  Risk,  and  the  Mark  R. Rosenzweig  December  1992  C. Banton
Composiion and Profitability  of  Hans  P. Binswanger  34783
Agricultural Investments